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Topic 90 of 189

OHM-Style Forks and Protocol-Owned Liquidity

How OlympusDAO popularised the (3,3) game theory and protocol-owned liquidity, why the forks all collapsed, and what survived from the experiment.

Beginner
8 min readUpdated July 2026Block Clarity Hub Editorial Team

The basics

What OlympusDAO Was Trying to Do

OlympusDAO (OHM, launched 2021) tried to build a decentralised reserve currency. Three key innovations: bonding (users sell ETH/DAI/LP tokens to the protocol in exchange for discounted OHM, building protocol treasury), staking (locking OHM earned rebases that grew the balance), and 'protocol-owned liquidity' (treasury owned the AMM liquidity rather than relying on third-party LPs). Initial valuations went vertical: OHM hit ~$1300/token at peak in October 2021. The protocol's '(3,3)' meme implied everyone would benefit if everyone staked.

Why It Collapsed

OHM's emissions were dramatic — staking yields exceeded 7,000% APY at peak. Math: emissions to stakers required the token price to grow continuously to maintain APY. When growth stalled, stakers had no reason to hold; selling pressure overwhelmed buying pressure. OHM dropped from ~$1300 to ~$10 in 2022 — a 99%+ drawdown. The (3,3) game theory worked in the upswing but failed catastrophically in the downturn. Most OHM forks (Wonderland TIME, KlimaDAO, many others) followed similar trajectories.

What Survived

The protocol-owned liquidity (POL) concept survived and influenced subsequent DeFi designs. Many protocols now own at least a portion of their AMM liquidity to reduce dependence on mercenary LPs. The bonding mechanism (users selling assets to protocol in exchange for discounted tokens) influenced subsequent treasury-building patterns. The lessons about emissions-driven Ponzi-shape failure were absorbed across the DeFi industry. The specific OHM-style implementation died; the ideas didn't.

  • OHM tried to build a decentralised reserve currency
  • Mechanisms: bonding, staking with rebases, protocol-owned liquidity
  • Collapsed 99%+ when emissions-driven price growth stalled
  • Forks (Wonderland TIME, Klima, others) followed similar trajectories

Key Takeaways

  • OlympusDAO was the canonical OHM-style protocol
  • (3,3) game theory worked in upswings, failed catastrophically in downturns
  • Most OHM forks experienced similar 95%+ collapses
  • Protocol-owned liquidity concept survived; emissions-driven designs didn't

Going deeper

The Bonding Mechanism

OHM bonding worked as follows. A user could deposit ETH, DAI, or LP tokens to the protocol. In exchange, they received OHM tokens at a discount to spot price, vesting over a few days. The protocol kept the deposited assets in its treasury. This created treasury growth (protocol accumulated capital) at the cost of OHM dilution (new tokens minted). The mechanism was meant to be self-sustaining: bond inflows would grow faster than dilution, increasing per-token treasury backing. In practice, dilution outpaced inflows once growth slowed.

Staking Rebases

OHM stakers received rebases — their token balance grew at ~7,000% APY at peak. This was funded by emissions. The 'meme' was that stakers shouldn't sell because their balance was constantly growing. Mathematically, if everyone held, the price could stabilise. In practice, some stakers always sold (paying rent, taking profits, etc.), and as the price stalled, selling accelerated. The rebase mechanism couldn't survive any sustained selling pressure.

Treasury Backing

OHM tokens were notionally backed by treasury assets (each OHM had X dollars of treasury per token). The minimum theoretical price was the treasury-per-token value. In reality, OHM traded at substantial premium to treasury value — peaked at >100x. When sentiment collapsed, price approached treasury backing but the asymmetry of falling premium was devastating to holders. Treasury backing was real but inadequate to support the market cap.

Protocol-Owned Liquidity Lives On

Despite the OHM collapse, POL remained influential. Frax, dYdX V4, and many others use POL principles. The insight: protocols owning their own liquidity reduces dependence on third-party LPs and aligns long-term incentives. The execution matters; POL alone isn't a silver bullet, but combined with sustainable tokenomics it's a useful tool.

Key Takeaways

  • Bonding accumulated treasury but caused dilution; balance was structurally fragile
  • Rebases sustained APY illusion but were entirely emission-driven
  • Treasury backing was real but inadequate at peak premiums
  • POL concept survived; specific OHM implementation didn't

Under the hood

The Game Theory of (3,3)

(3,3) referred to a game theory payoff matrix: if everyone stakes (cooperates), everyone benefits (3,3 in the payoff matrix). If some sell (defect), defectors benefit and cooperators lose (3,-3 or 1,1). The DAO posters argued (3,3) was the optimal strategy. Mathematically, this required everyone to commit to never selling — an unsustainable equilibrium. In game theory, defection is rational unless commitment is enforced. (3,3) was naive about defection dynamics; reality proved this.

Inverse Bonds and Treasury Defence

When OHM price crashed, OlympusDAO introduced 'inverse bonds' — protocol buying back OHM from holders at premium prices using treasury assets. This temporarily supported the price but rapidly depleted treasury. Several other OHM forks tried similar treasury-defence mechanisms during their collapses. None succeeded long-term. Treasury defence can buy time but can't reverse fundamental tokenomic failure.

Lessons Absorbed Across DeFi

OHM and its forks taught DeFi several painful lessons. Emissions-driven yield without underlying revenue collapses. (3,3) game theory ignores rational defection. Treasury backing must be commensurate with market cap. Protocol-owned liquidity is valuable but not sufficient. Many subsequent DeFi designs explicitly avoid OHM patterns. The 'we're not OHM, our tokenomics are different' becomes the standard line, with varying levels of accuracy.

Survivors and Reinvention

Some OHM derivatives survived and evolved. Olympus itself eventually pivoted to focus on RBS (Range-Bound Stability) — a more sustainable treasury management approach. Some forks pivoted to fully different models. The narrative of 'reinventing money via DeFi' did not die with OHM; subsequent projects (Frax v2, GHO from Aave, others) have taken different paths to similar goals. The specific OHM implementation is widely studied as a cautionary tale.

Beware New OHM-Like Designs

Periodically, new projects launch with OHM-style mechanics (high APY, bonding, rebases, treasury backing claims). The math hasn't changed; the failure modes haven't changed. If you see a project with emission-funded yields above sustainable rates, treasury backing claims as primary value support, and (3,3) memetic culture, the prior is failure. The specific market regime may delay collapse but doesn't change the structural dynamics.

Key Takeaways

  • (3,3) game theory was naive about rational defection
  • Treasury defence (inverse bonds, buybacks) can't reverse fundamental tokenomic failure
  • Industry absorbed lessons: emissions without revenue = collapse
  • Olympus pivoted to RBS; the original model is studied as a cautionary tale
  • New OHM-like designs periodically emerge; the structural failure modes persist

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References & further reading